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Abstract This article provides an assessment and critique of the National Integrity
System approach and methodology, informed by the experience of conducting an NIS
review in Cambodia. It explores four key issues that potentially undermine the rele-
vance and value of NIS reports for developing democracies: the narrowly conceived
institutional approach underpinning the NIS methodology; the insufficient appreciation
of cultural distinctiveness; a failure properly to conceptualise and articulate the very
notion of ‘integrity’; and an over-emphasis on compliance-based approaches to com-
bating corruption at the expense of the positive promotion of integrity. The article seeks
to offer some pointers to how the NIS approach could be adapted to broaden its
conceptualisation of institutions and integrity, and thereby provide reports that are
more theoretically informed as well as being more constructive and actionable.
Introduction
Much of the work on anti-corruption over the last two decades has focused on
identifying mechanisms to reduce the incentives for corrupt activity, or else on estab-
lishing institutional structures to enhance the capacity to detect and curb corruption.
Although ‘good governance’ has long been presented as a key part of the fight against
corruption, its precise meaning and application remain highly contested [1]. Moreover,
the emphasis on good governance – particularly in the state-centred political economy
approach adopted by many international development organisations – has often been
seen as betraying an ethnocentric, Western bias that militates against countries in the
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developing world being able to implement appropriate reforms to their government
structures. Far less attention has been paid to the obverse of curbing corruption: that is,
promoting integrity. The development of Transparency International’s National Integ-
rity System (NIS) approach therefore came as a welcome development insofar as it has
sought to shift the emphasis away from an overt focus on corruption and towards the
mechanisms that promote more positive dimensions of governance.
In this paper, we nevertheless argue that in practice, the NIS approach is open to four
major criticisms:
a. Its underpinning rationale remains wedded to a narrowly conceived institutional
focus, reflected in an emphasis on anti-corruption policies and procedures;
b. Despite an apparent flexibility in application, its underlying universalistic approach
betrays a lack of cultural sensitivity and a bias towards established democracies;
c. The notion of ‘integrity’ is poorly conceptualised and articulated;
d. The focus of NIS reports is primarily on compliance-based approaches to anti-
corruption, rather than more values-based or ethical understandings.
Each of these critiques is problematic in its own right, but the collective effect has
especially serious ramifications. In situations where countries have non-western cultur-
al understandings of integrity and a greater emphasis upon values-based reform policies
rather than relying only on strict compliance with anti-corruption measures, the results
may be particularly negative. Moreover, evaluative approaches suffering from these
limitations may fail to highlight positive (or, indeed, negative) practices that fall outside
of a narrow conceptualisation of public life. In practice, the NIS methodology assesses
governance systems against liberal democratic ideals.
The question, then, is whether using such a tough measuring stick to evaluate
countries that are still not democratically developed produces a constructive – or even
appropriate – evaluation. This is particularly important because Transparency Interna-
tional’s NIS approach is designed primarily as a national-level advocacy tool, as
elsewhere described (Macaulay & Mulcahy, this issue) rather than as a basis for
comparative study. The overriding objective must therefore be to ensure that the results
can be used effectively or helpfully in the local context. In locations where democracy
remains in its early stages – whether due to recent conflict, the lasting effects of
colonization, decolonization, global capitalism, or limited industrialization, education
and economic development – the NIS indicator questions and scoring framework may
lead to highly critical outcomes. The concern is that smaller and incremental, yet still
genuine, achievements in improving the governance systems of such countries may be
overlooked because the institutions assessed do not yet match international standards.
Of course, it is important to note that these criticisms are recurrent concerns within
much of the academic and critical literature dealing with the measurement and evalu-
ation of corruption (see, for example, UNDP, [2–4]). As a result, they do not imply that
the NIS approach is a uniquely or even particularly poor method of evaluating
countries. Indeed, there is a growing debate about the impact of assessments and
rankings. Andersson and Heywood [2] identified how aid conditionality attached to
countries’ performance in the Corruption Perceptions Index risked creating a ‘corrup-
tion trap’; while Erkkila and Piironen [5] argued that indices of good governance
institutionalise certain causal beliefs and normative goals into depoliticised ‘self-
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evidences’ or ‘truths’; and the NGO, Global Integrity, abandoned publishing its own
Index in 2011, stating that ‘country rankings are too blunt and generalised to be
Bactionable^ and inform real debate and policy choices’ (cited in [6]: 148). Meanwhile,
Cooley and Snyder [7] have highlighted how international rankings have emerged as a
key tool of global governance, and how such an approach may lead to policymakers
internalising questionable normative assumptions resulting in poorer, not improved,
public policy outcomes.
Given the branding of the NIS and its seemingly positive focus on integrity rather
than corruption per se, as well as its eschewing of any league table format, it might be
hoped that the NIS would be less susceptible to such problems. In this paper, however,
we highlight the extent to which this cannot be taken for granted, exploring how each
of the four criticisms mentioned above can also be applied to the NIS method, with
practical illustrations from the experience of conducting a NIS assessment in Cambo-
dia. Indeed, we show that the current NIS methodology struggles to value and
appropriately recognise the efforts made in some developing countries to address
corruption within an appropriate national context. Our argument is that if it is to gain
purchase in such countries, it needs to be reformulated to allow for more recognition of
specific cultural challenges and national legacies. Let us be clear: we recognize that
corruption is a very significant and deep-rooted problem in Cambodia, but our concern
is to identify ways in which the NIS approach may be better able to support effective
reform.
Whilst this case study does not necessarily have answers to all the questions it raises,
it seeks to generate discussion about the extent to which cultural distinctiveness should
be considered in the future evolution of the NIS methodology. Taking account of
different historical contexts and stages of development may help to produce reports
that are more constructive, and therefore actionable, for the governments of developing
countries. Ultimately, this may help to bolster the success of NIS advocacy campaigns
undertaken by Transparency International’s national chapters and associated stake-
holders. We therefore begin by providing a brief review of the NIS assessment,
focusing on its aims and scope; and conclude by offering some suggestions for
broadening the current NIS approach.
The aims and scope of the NIS
As set out elsewhere (Brown & Heinrich, this issue), the idea of a National Integrity
System (NIS) evaluation was first proposed by Jeremy Pope in a Transparency
International Sourcebook, published in 1996, and further elaborated the following year
by Pope along with Petter Langseth and Rick Stapenhurst ([8]; see also [9]). They
argued ([8]: 521) that
while each country or region is unique in its own history and culture, its political
system, and its stage of economic and social development, similarities in a
national integrity system do exist and lessons learned are often transferable.
This core understanding of similarities between countries led Langseth et al. [8] to
propose an ostensibly universal system for evaluating integrity in a range of countries.
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The core elements of this system were ‘public sector anti-corruption strategies, watch-
dog agencies, public awareness and participation, accountability of the courts, roles of
the media and the private sector, and international cooperation’ ([8]: 521). This list was
not intended to be prescriptive ([9]: 318), although in practice approaches since 1997
have largely followed the lead of Langseth et al. These core elements are conceptual-
ized as ‘pillars’, as in a Greek temple, with each standing in support of the overarching
integrity system.
The temple metaphor still forms the key visual representation in recent NIS reports.
The choice of a temple metaphor has always been somewhat odd, since even in a
system with a very low level of corruption it is unlikely that any single pillar would be
at the maximal height, much less that all pillars would be. Temples, of course, are only
fully stable to the extent that all pillars are the same height; but stability does not
depend on the absolute height of the pillars, just their uniformity. In practice, NIS
assessments usually describe architecturally impossible ‘temples’. However, this is not
merely an architectural observation, since the visual metaphor reinforces the idea that
the fundamental aim is to maximize the height of each individual pillar. Moreover,
within the temple metaphor the pillars are more-or-less distinct objects, with each
standing or falling on its own; a real temple, on the other hand, requires a given
number of pillars, each at the same height, but is potentially able to lose the whole of an
individual pillar and remain standing. Integrity systems are instead complex and
intertwined; a collapse in integrity in watchdog agencies, for example, will almost
inherently encourage more unethical behavior elsewhere. While individual NIS assess-
ments may well recognize such interconnections, the temple metaphor downplays
discussion of this complexity and interdependency.
Critiques of the temple metaphor have led some authors to suggest reformulations of
how the roles and connections of integrity systems should be conceptualized. Notably,
Sampford et al. [10] suggested a bird’s nest as a more appropriate metaphor for integrity
systems. A bird’s nest does not depend upon any individual stick, but a well made nest
will be structurally strong. The absence of any individual stick can often be compen-
sated for by other sticks, in the same way that poor functioning in some public
institutions can potentially be compensated for by above average performance among
other institutions. If the goal of a NIS assessment is to diagnose problems and provide
policy makers with potential solutions, then understanding – and crucially communi-
cating – the interrelationships between institutions seems to be just as important as
understanding the functioning of individual components ([10]: 104; see also [11]: 640).
As outlined elsewhere (Macaulay &Mulcahy, this issue), the dozens of in-depth NIS
reports published by TI, covering countries as diverse as the UK, Pakistan and
Kazakhstan, present a series of evaluations of public institutions as well as non-state
institutions and civil society. Again as a result of assumed similarities between coun-
tries, these focus on a specific, and usually consistent, set of primary elements, or core
institutions (TI [12]):
& Legislature
& Executive
& Judiciary
& Public Sector
& Law Enforcement Agencies
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& Electoral Management Bodies
& Ombudsman
& Supreme Audit Institution
& Anti-corruption agencies
& Political Parties
& Media
& Civil Society
& Business
These ‘pillars’ of the NIS temple form the basis of analysis and resulting reform
discussions. On one hand, the approach has potential to be more reflexive than this may
suggest. Whilst in practice there is a push to include all pillars, even in systems where
some have very limited relevance, there are opportunities to include additional pillars
based upon the local context. Further, in TI’s formulation (see TI, [13]: 152–155), these
pillars are underpinned by the temple’s ‘foundations’: (1) the society’s political-
institutional foundations, concerning the extent to which political institutions support
an effective NIS, (2) socio-political foundations, concerning whether social groups, and
the organization of those groups, are supportive of an effective NIS, (3) socio-economic
foundations, concerning whether the division of economic rewards is supportive of an
effective NIS, and (4) socio-cultural foundations, concerning the extent to which
societal norms and values are supportive of an effective NIS.
On the other hand, despite the detailed, and often reflexive, nature of the evaluations
that result, the scale and focus of the assessments remains generally problematic. In the
following sections we analyse these problems as fourfold: (1) the institutional focus of
NIS evaluations, (2) their tendency towards a lack of cultural sensitivity, (3) their failure
adequately to define ‘integrity’, and (4) their focus on compliance-based policies at the
expense of more values-based understandings.
The NIS’s institutional focus
The NIS approach, by design, has a strong institutional focus; evaluations are ultimate-
ly conducted at the level of institutions and integrity systems themselves are understood
in relation to the performance of a series of institutions. This is not wrong per se;
institutions are undoubtedly important for conditioning how the individuals within
those institutions act, and the range of possible actions for the people within them
[14]. However, the conception of institutions in NIS reports is narrow, mainly focusing
on formal law enforcement and corruption-combating agencies. According to Grebe
and Woermann [15], the NIS’s ‘technical view of institutions is restricted and fails to
take into account the complex historical, cultural, social and political factors that shape
institutional configurations and influence whether they work as expected. It also has a
rather shallow theoretical underpinning.’
It is important to remember that institutions are rooted in specific contexts, and
moreover that they can also encompass unwritten codes of conduct, norms of behav-
iour, beliefs and customs that influence and shape behaviour [16]. There is a risk that
our implicit notion of how ‘uncorrupted’ or ‘proper’ politics should be organized is
based on Western-style liberal democratic institutions [17, 18]. Such assumptions about
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the ‘proper’ form of institutions are indeed rooted in the NIS framework itself: the TI
method encourages national chapters to include pillars in an NIS assessment regardless
of whether each one exists in their country. The objective of this approach is often
unclear; while it can be used to assess how the same or comparable functions are being
fulfilled even in the absence of a particular pillar, the tendency is to establish a case for
the creation of any missing institution. Thus, in Cambodia, for instance, there is no
national level ombudsman; however there are two sub-national complaints-handling
mechanisms. Whilst the NIS framework does allow for such nuances, the implicit
assumptions about the proper institutional form of a country are strong. Whether
following the pre-defined ‘proper’ organizational path is better, or not, is a more
difficult question than can be easily addressed in a NIS evaluation, resulting instead
in a Bpushing^ of specific institutional forms which may be misplaced.
Also problematic is the fact that an excessively institutional approach makes key
assumptions about what factors shape political behaviour and outcomes. Whilst, as has
been noted, institutions likely have an important role to play in conditioning behaviour,
or at least in framing the range of appropriate responses [19, 20], it is unrealistic to see
institutional settings as the sole, or most important, determinant of individual actions.
Thus, we do not expect the individuals who work within any given institution to be
uniformly corrupt, or uniformly to act with integrity, despite operating within an
identical institutional framework. Assuming that the most effective solutions to the
problem of corruption revolve around institutional design will almost always lead to
sub-optimal outcomes, precisely because such assumptions are based on a reduction of
human behavior to little more than an algorithm that evaluates actions against a series
of probabilities in a discrete choice model.
In reality, the complex mixture of societal norms and values has a significant role to
play in determining the probability that any individual will engage in corruption, and
thus also has a highly significant effect upon the likelihood of a specific type of
institutional structure being able to promote integrity. As noted earlier, NIS evaluations
do allow consideration of these values and norms as a ‘foundation’ concern, but the
method typically only provides space for the political, economic, cultural and societal
foundations of a national system to be briefly discussed at the beginning of each report,
and does not evaluate specific pillars in light of these foundations. A result is that
dedicated anti-corruption policies and procedures remain the primary means through
which integrity is to be ensured. ‘Scoring questions’, used in the NIS evaluations to
determine the temple pillar heights, have a heavy bias towards the existence of specific
rules and policies. Whilst they do also take account of the practical application of rules,
narrow rules-based evaluations are not only more easily manipulated, but may also
miss any pro-integrity actions of public officials which are guided more by their
personal values than formal rules.
In the case of Cambodia, a stark example of the potential impacts of these limitations
stems from the fact that 95% of the population identifies as Buddhist (US Dept of State,
[21]: 1). Buddhist leaders are highly respected in society and are considered to be
conveyors of morality, promoting societal level values that reject narrow materialistic
accumulation in favour of social integrity. Not only do the Buddhist leaders represent a
strong potential contributor to social change towards greater integrity (WFDD, [22]: 6),
they also provide a set of values that shape reactions to institutional incentives. In this
context, the notion that any one particular configuration of institutional design will be
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universally appropriate, despite differences in values-systems, is surely untenable. Yet
the current NIS method allows for recognition of the role of such value-systems only as
either (1) a ‘foundational’ issue, (2) as a potential sub-element of the role of ‘civil
society organisations’ as an NIS pillar, i.e. as a collective institution including religious
organisations, or (3) the addition of a new institutional ‘pillar’, discussed further below.
None of these options provide a sufficient path for understanding the specific nature,
impacts, content and political dynamics of Buddhism’s role in the integrity system,
despite it being potentially more significant than many (or perhaps any) of the
institutions around which the NIS method is framed.
NIS and cultural sensitivity
As has been noted, it was one of the hopes of the NIS approach that lessons from one
country could be applied to others (see [8]: 521). In part, this was based upon an
understanding of the fundamental similarities of countries; and thus, as we have just
seen, the NIS methodology treats countries as if they are all essentially comparable,
with the default expectation being that the same institutional pillars will be the most
important elements through which integrity systems can be evaluated. Of course, the
current NIS methodology does allow for some adaptation to local contexts, in the ways
mentioned above. Questions can also be carefully interpreted or altered to ensure they
are culturally relevant, although if this is done without being systematised it risks
creating methodological inefficiencies and could undermine the lesson-learning capac-
ity that was originally envisaged.
Indeed, pillars can be modified or new ones added to reflect the core governance
institutions in a country, and various national assessments have seen adaptation of the NIS
methodology to include additional institutions considered important in the governance
system. Malawi’s 2013 NIS assessment, for instance, included a pillar on ‘Traditional
Leaders’ (Transparency International, [23]: 239). The role of traditional leaders (i.e.
Chiefs) pre-dates colonial times, and has been identified as an ongoing institution of
integrity in Malawi’s public life; they are considered to exercise a lot of influence in the
political arena. In Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 2013 NIS assessment, ‘International Insti-
tutions’ were included as an extra pillar (Transparency International, [24]: 229). This
reflects the important although diminishing role they have played in the country’s post-
war context. Serbia’s 2011 study added ‘Local Self Government’ as a new pillar ([25]:
297). Local governments are key actors in the country’s integrity system because they
have the legal power to independently regulate the organisation of public services within
their jurisdiction. As mentioned elsewhere (Macaulay & Mulcahy, this issue), the New
Zealand NIS assessment was adapted not only to similarly include local government as a
pillar, but to discuss the role of the Treaty of Waitangi, and principles of Indigenous
involvement and co-management, in relation to all institutional pillars.
The problem is whether this potential for readjustment goes far enough to ensure the
NIS study takes appropriate account of the cultural context under assessment, espe-
cially in light of the strong assumptions of comparability inherent in the NIS approach.
The main concern is that there might be a fundamental bias in the methodology that
means the results of NIS assessments are also systematically more positive for countries
that have attained certain levels of development.
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Again, the Cambodian example is instructive. At Cambodia’s National Integrity
Workshop, held in November 2013, the approach was specifically criticised as being
largely ahistorical, and as having limited cultural relevance. A senior government
official later reiterated this feedback when Transparency International Cambodia pre-
sented the final draft of the report to the Ministry of Interior in May 2014. The common
theme highlighted was that the methodology did not take sufficient account of the
cultural and historical specificities that have contributed to the limitations of the
Cambodian governance system in its current formation. This history is unique and
complex. The challenges faced by the modern society are underpinned first by the fact
that in the 90 years that the country was a French protectorate, gaining independence in
1953, only a minimal number of elite secular schools were built ([26]: 39). Hence, high
levels of education and intellectual life were still restricted to a small proportion of the
population when civil war broke out 15 years later.
This situation was obviously compounded when the Khmer Rouge emerged
victorious and came to power from 1975 until 1979 ([27]: 233, 255). The Khmer
Rouge killed the police, military and bureaucratic elite of the old society, as well
as teachers, doctors, engineers, and intellectuals ([26]: 167). It is estimated that
during the four years of the regime two million people – or one in four of the
population – died as a result of overwork or maltreatment, or were executed ([27]:
259). The public sector was obliterated. Conflict continued in Cambodia until
settled by the Paris Peace Agreements in 1991, leading to the first post-conflict
elections only in 1993 ([28]: xiv; [27]: 277–89).
The subsequent two decades saw the government, donors and civil society work to
build the capacity of public institutions, provide adequate basic services, and uphold a
stable governance system. Whilst democracy remains limited, and corruption remains
deeply embedded, Cambodia has certainly made commendable gains in a challenging
post-conflict setting. Yet the qualitative findings and scores of the 2014 Cambodia NIS
assessment are not particularly encouraging. All but 3 of the 13 pillars fall into the weak
or very weak category. Despite a few islands of change in the public sector that have
started to resemble global standards, Cambodia’s governance system is well below the
democratic standards against which institutions in the NIS are measured. The problem
is that, whilst some of the shortfalls in the Cambodian governance system are undeni-
ably due to the unaccountable structures enacted and upheld by existing power-holders,
historical events and cultural context almost certainly have an even larger role in
defining its continuing limitations. Even acknowledging that the broadly unfavourable
findings of the 2014 Cambodia NIS assessment are owed partly to decisions and
actions of the country’s current leaders, and to the subjective interpretation of available
information by the report’s researchers and authors, the design of the NIS methodology
tends, inherently, to favour more industrialised countries in which democracy has been
much longer established.
Essential to consider here is whether the NIS scoring and indicator questions
overlook or downplay some of the arguably more fundamental and incremental
achievements made by countries in transition. For instance, whilst the Cambodian
public sector has not yet reached a stage in which its institutions can be considered
to operate accountably and effectively on the level expected of global-standard democ-
racies, significant achievements have none the less been made, given that the public
sector had to be reconstructed almost from scratch [29, 30]. This included the
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(re)building of hospitals, schools and ministries. Likewise, after the Khmer Rouge fell,
very few trained and educated individuals were left to occupy administrative positions.
Only an estimated 450 teachers survived the Khmer Rouge of an estimated 5000
existing prior to the regime; likewise only 50 doctors remained out of an estimated
500 [31–33]. Moreover, only 10 legal graduates, including 5 judges are estimated to
have survived when the Khmer Rouge period ended in 1979 ([34]: 338). Concerted
efforts have been made to establish training centres, and provide public officials
with necessary skills to undertake their roles. For instance, the Police Academy was
established only in 2000, and is now central to building the capacity of the national
police and provides various courses from short, department or skill-specific training
courses, to longer Bachelor and Master degree programmes (Police Academy of
Cambodia, [35]; CNP, [36]). These efforts have been implemented on limited
budgets – Cambodia remains a low-income economy, even though the country
has experienced notable economic growth [37] and has received sustained overseas
development aid [38].
Despite the shortfalls, Cambodia’s progress towards the United Nation’s Millennium
Development Goals is an indicator of some successes in public sector reforms. Ever
increasing numbers of children are accessing primary education (RGC, [39]: 16); the
prevalence of HIV, malaria and tuberculosis has fallen (RGC, [39]: 27); and the
proportion of the population living below the poverty line reduced by 30% between
2007 and 2011 ([37]; UNDP, [40]). Yet despite such dramatic improvements, it is easy
for evaluation or indicator questions such as contained in the NIS method to overlook
some of the more baseline achievements that have been made by governance institu-
tions. For instance, the Cambodian judiciary does not have comprehensive legal
regulations governing judicial salaries, there is insufficient training to enhance judges’
knowledge of the law, and there is no independent judicial services commission. In
terms of NIS indicators, Cambodia inevitably scores poorly on this front. Yet, in itself,
the mere fact that multiple courts and dozens of judges exist represents a significant
achievement of the last two decades. Capacity building of those courts and legal
professionals is a gradual and on-going process.
Similarly, while considerable efforts have been made to begin professionalising the
police force, as noted above, these slow but steady improvements tend not be accounted
for, due to the fact that the police do not yet have rules stipulating clear professional
criteria, do not publicly disclose comprehensive information regarding law enforcement
work, and do not yet have an effective citizens’ complaints mechanism.
How can the NIS indicator questions take better account of the elementary efforts
that are necessary to rebuild a governance system in a post-conflict or transitional
context? The starting point is to recognise that the scoring framework already
assumes a certain level of development, with transitioning democracies, who face
multifaceted and specific challenges, receiving very critical analysis and lower
scores because basic initiatives get overlooked. While the NIS approach aims to
capture the absolute strength of the integrity system, the methodology leaves
readers largely ignorant of the direction of travel. If a country is starting from a
low base, but building fast, this is surely a more positive picture than a country
starting from a high base and declining. The ‘one shot’ nature of the NIS, coupled
with the reductionism inherent in the ‘temple’ summary of the NIS evaluation,
abstracts away important nuances about country level developments.
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The meaning of ‘integrity’ in NIS assessments
Notwithstanding that the NIS terminology focuses upon an ‘integrity system’, the
methodology of TI’s NIS assessments has an explicit emphasis upon anti-corruption
institutions and instruments. Even though it is possible to see corruption as the opposite
of integrity, it is far from obvious that integrity is the opposite of corruption (for a recent
discussion, see [41]). Indeed, one can theoretically act wholly in a non-corrupt way,
whilst still having only minimal levels of integrity [42]. This sort of circumstance may
emerge in situations where the only reason people do not engage in corruption is
because the structure of incentives presented to them makes corruption less appealing
than being non-corrupt. However, as soon as a new situation emerges in which
disincentives to engage in corruption do not exist, the individual decides their course
of action without reference to moral concerns, instead attempting merely to maximize
their own personal utility. As such, anti-corruption measures alone do not, but also
cannot, guarantee integrity. Thus, the overt focus on anti-corruption in the NIS is
potentially misleading, and moreover reinforces pre-existing biases that favour formal-
ized rules and codes.
The difficulties posed by an inadequate understanding of integrity within NIS
assessments are also of wider practical concern. Integrity serves a wider role in ethical
governance than anti-corruption. Where public officials have a strong anti-corruption
ethos (or regulations that enforce strong anti-corruption policies), citizens can trust
public officials to not act corruptly in specific and pre-defined circumstances. Yet
integrity serves a wider purpose, including the general role of providing a foundation
for citizens to trust their political systems. If public officials do not have integrity, it is
difficult to see why citizens should trust them or why they should assume good faith in
their activities in any situation where anti-corruption regulations cannot guarantee
compliance. In the real world, where regulations will always struggle to ensure
compliance, a purely anti-corruption approach removes the rational basis for choosing
to trust public officials; conversely, integrity in public life supports such trust. This links
to a broader argument within public administration about the most effective way to
build trust. As Foster Back [43] puts it, ‘the essential question remains is trust better
engendered by principled behaviour based on Bdoing it because it is the right thing to
do^ or because the individual, the company or the public body has to?’.
Anti-corruption, and the evaluation of an absence of anti-corruption policies, are also
especially problematic to define outside of Western-style liberal countries. In Cambo-
dia, the NIS research team encountered several questions that had limited applicability
to the local country context, including questions such as: Are there examples of
attempted interference by external actors, particularly the government or judiciary, in
the activities of the legislature? To what extent is the symptom of the ‘revolving door’
(i.e. executive officials moving back and forth between big business and government
positions) a concern? Are there any examples of undue external interference in judicial
proceedings? These questions already assume a certain level of separation between
institutions. In Cambodia however, the entire public sector is centralised and controlled
by a narrow group of ruling party-aligned power holders under the tight control of the
Prime Minister. In this case, asking for examples of undue external interference in
public bodies has limited relevance, since very little separation exists across institutions
in the sector. Such an institutional framework cuts against the anti-corruption
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assumptions of NIS evaluations, and indeed does theoretically make corruption easier
for motivated people at the head of government. However, the specific institutional
framework alone does not in itself guarantee that corruption is actually occurring. Such
a system could be compatible with high levels of integrity, to the extent that the leaders
act with integrity.
An anti-corruption focus therefore risks obscuring the actual level of integrity within
systems. Of course, even if not entirely applicable, such evaluation questions did
underscore how centralised the Cambodian governance system is compared to inter-
national democratic ideals – and to that extent, prompted useful considerations that
were reflected in the report. Whether a less centralised system would necessarily equate
to a stronger integrity system is nevertheless not directly established.
The NIS assessment as a compliance-tool
Finally, as has been mentioned above, TI’s NIS assessment reports have an explicit
focus upon anti-corruption, rather than pro-integrity, policies. A further implication is
that NIS evaluations, and thus also the recommendations for improvement that follow
them, have a strong focus on compliance-based policies rather than values-based
policies. Put simply, compliance-based policies are those routine anti-corruption poli-
cies that aim to create a system of rules and regulations that prevent corruption, whereas
values-based policies are those that attempt to instil a culture such that corruption is not
a preferred choice (for a more detailed discussion, see [44]). Compliance policies can
also be thought of as representing a model of low trust and high distrust, ‘characterized
by fear, skepticism, and vigilance, where harmful motives are assumed, and regulations
and controls are put in place’; while values-based policies represent high trust and low
distrust, ‘characterized by hope, faith, and assurance… where opportunities are pursued
and new initiatives are undertaken’ ([45]: 231).
The favouring of compliance policies is not just a normative bias; it is a potentially
problematic view of public life, especially because of the role of trust as facilitator of
pro-social actions. It is nevertheless an essential part of the methodology of TI’s NIS
evaluations. To take a concrete example, the ‘scoring question’ for evaluating integrity
mechanisms for legislatures, asks: ‘To what extent are there mechanisms in place to
ensure the integrity of members of the legislature?’ (TI, [13]: 9). The ‘guiding ques-
tions’, which scorers ought to consider in evaluating this section, refer almost exclu-
sively to ‘rules’, ‘codes’, ‘declarations’, and other prescriptive policies (TI, [13]: 9).
There is little, if any, room for an evaluator to consider other factors, such as ethics
training, culture or values inculcation. The same critiques could be leveled at the
evaluation of the practical implementation of integrity mechanisms – the focus is
almost exclusively upon the extent to which codes are adhered to (see TI, [13]: 10),
rather than the extent to which high-integrity behavior is manifested. As Taylor and
Torsello [46] have argued, ‘it is difficult to force an ethical culture by ways of legal and
sanctioning actions’.
However, even if NIS assessments do explicitly and systematically favour
compliance-based policies, it may be objected that this is not normatively bad; indeed,
it may be observed that compliance-based policies ought to be preferred. Modern states
are enormous, highly complex, diverse, and powerful. Maintaining an adequate ethical
Cultural specificity versus institutional universalism: a critique...
climate in such circumstances, especially if coupled with fewer codes and less moni-
toring, can be extremely challenging. And, indeed, it may be argued that regulations
can serve to create a positive ethical climate by constraining undesirable behaviours.
Yet compliance-based policies also have a number of disadvantages in certain situa-
tions. First, the size and diversity of public life is a problem not just for values-based
systems; indeed, compliance-based systems can suffer even greater problems, in part
because the size and complexity of the state means that unforeseen cases in which the
regulations are not sufficient to ensure integrity can occur quite frequently.
Moreover, because compliance systems largely remove personal discretion from
public officials, the potential exists for situations in which both efficiency and justice
are sacrificed in order to comply with the demands of formal policies (on the ineffi-
ciencies of anti-corruption approaches, see [47]). On the other hand, if high personal
ethical standards can be inculcated in public officials, in the manner suggested by
values-based approaches, strict (and potentially overbearing) micro regulation will be
far less necessary. In turn, this implies the need for some discretion on the part of public
officials, affording them the opportunity to select proactively the ethical course of
action in the course of their duties. Such a system largely removes the need to develop a
regulatory framework to handle every situation an official will encounter, which in turn
allows their decisions to be informed by the specific context in which a decision is
taken. As might be expected, such a system can be more efficient and cost effective
than a compliance-based system, as it dramatically reduces the administrative burden
upon officials.
Outside of theoretical archetypes, real world integrity systems will obviously never
represent a pure values-based or pure compliance-based system; instead, each system
contains elements from each type. However, that does not mean that each formulation
works equally well in any circumstance, or that introducing more of one type of policy
will have no consequences for the other type. Indeed, because policies can create
feedback loops and ultimately become self-reinforcing, introducing more of one type of
regulation can imply less of the other – an observation that is especially true with
compliance-based regulations, which can be particularly damaging to integrity values
(see [48, 49]). Identifying the most helpful form of ethical regulation is a serious and
difficult task, especially in a country like Cambodia, which is seeking to build its
integrity system from such a low base. The question of how many compliance policies
are necessary, which ones are the most important, and under what circumstances
values-based policies are preferable, are vital. Yet in countries such as Cambodia, the
potential for introducing strong values-based policies may be lost if too great a push is
made towards compliance policies early on, because of compliance policies’ known
effect of reducing values-based motivations for acting ethically ([49]: 273). Rather than
striking an appropriate balance, the concern is that too great an emphasis upon
compliance policies in NIS assessments may compromise the overall effectiveness of
the integrity system.
Discussion and conclusions
It is obvious that national circumstances differ between countries. Different histories,
different cultures, different laws, different standards of governance, and different
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institutional settings are all in play. Even small differences in these factors can
dramatically alter not only what reforms are feasible, but also what reforms are
possible. In this sense, the often largely ahistorical and acultural approach of NIS
evaluations, with consequential assumptions about what reforms ought to be imple-
mented, presents significant limitations relative to more culturally and context-sensitive
analyses. As we have suggested, imposing a compliance-based regulatory structure on
a system that already has a strong and well functioning values-based component to
ethical regulation has the potential to do more harm than good.
The problem, then, is the extent to which evaluations such as the NIS approach are
beset by an unhelpful universalism that reflects a specific set of cultural and institu-
tional assumptions. Indeed, drawing on the experience of the NIS in Cambodia, there is
a real risk that baseline achievements in transitioning countries may be overlooked by
the NIS. Whilst such national systems may not have reached global democratic
standards, they may none the less have made fundamental efforts that are not appro-
priately accounted for by the current NIS indicators and scoring framework. Since the
bar against which institutions are measured is raised so high, less industrialised
countries are likely to fare poorly in the NIS analysis and results.
To counter this, we have noted that NIS evaluations may work better in situations
where the local team goes beyond the standard set of institutions, and adapts and adds
to the NIS temple pillars. Moreover, it is sometimes necessary for local research teams
to follow a more culturally sensitive interpretation of indicator questions in order to
modify the NIS methodology in relation to national contexts. However, even with such
adaptations, research teams can still face both criticism of and resistance to suggestions
arising out of NIS evaluations, precisely because the underpinning NIS methodology
does not take adequate account of context. In Cambodia, the government rejected the
report outright after publication. Officials argued that the report highlights all the
shortfalls of the system without accounting for the historical challenges and achieve-
ments that have been made. Whilst no simple answer to this issue exists – a report on
integrity and corruption is likely always going to be somewhat critical and confronting
to any government – there could be ways to tailor the methodology to make it serve
more clearly as a realistic and constructive call to action for the administration under
assessment. In turn, this may help to boost the cooperation of governance stakeholders
to implement the NIS recommendations.
With the aim of acknowledging the historical context, cultural challenges, and
achievements not mentioned elsewhere in the NIS evaluation, the research team from
Cambodia included a preface at the start of the report, reflecting on these issues in more
detail. This does not address all of the above concerns, but can deflect some of the more
obvious criticisms that a government may levy against a report once it is published. The
preface differed from the foundations in that it provided a short but unified space to link
together some of the foundational elements that led to a system in which corruption is
commonplace. It underlined the legacy of the Khmer Rouge in addition to mentioning
some of the development achievements Cambodia has recently made.
Going forward, these issues suggest considerable value in further evaluation of the
experiences of undertaking the NIS in other countries. If common themes and issues are
found, a revision of the NIS methodology would be logical. Different dimensions could
be emphasized for countries at varying stages of development. The existing approach
could be maintained for more established democracies, whilst alternative elements
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could be developed for transitioning democracies. Indicator questions could aim to
recognize the more foundational efforts made by countries in earlier stages of devel-
opment. For instance, in the law enforcement agencies section, questions could include:
Has a police academy been created? Have appropriate courses to train police at
different levels and roles been developed?
Such questions would capture some of the initial efforts required to set up a
democracy. Indeed, more emphasis on the positive promotion of integrity, as opposed
to anti-corruption measures, would be helpful. Equally, a broader understanding of
institutions and their functions, incorporating norms, beliefs and customs as an impor-
tant dimension of how they motivate and constrain behavior, would make it more
difficult for governments to dismiss NIS reports out of hand.
Even with such adaptations, the National Integrity System approach would remain
an institutionally focused evaluation. There is nothing inherently wrong with that: as
we know, institutions matter. However, experiences such as in Cambodia suggest that
what is needed is a more sophisticated and flexible understanding of institutions,
underpinned both by an approach that allows for analysis of transformations in
institutions, and also by a more theoretically informed understanding of the concept
of integrity. That way, NIS reports will not only provide a more realistic and appropriate
analysis of how integrity systems work in practice, but also be better placed to offer
constructive and actionable guides to action that can support genuine reform.
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